Approved For Release 1999/09/02 AREREM 1999/09/02 AREREM 1999/09/02-3 *Aemorandum* UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO THRU : Director of Security

DATE: : Deputy Director (Personnel and Physical Support)

7 MAY 1956

: Acting Chief, Personnel Security Division

SUBJECT: Repolygraph Program

REV DATE 2-5-80 BY 006/99 TYPE 03 ORIG COMP 3/_ OPI 3/ 2-REV CLASS . S PAGES ... ORIG CLASS __ Litt by extua JUST 22 MIXT BEV 241U

1. At your request, the repolygraph program was discussed with the appropriate individuals in PSD. As you are aware, present polygraph policy is substantially as follows:

> Polygraph tests are given to all EOD's; all conversions (where possible) from covert status to staff employee; all returnees from overseas and to personnel going overseas PCS if they have not been polygraphed within the past three years. In addition to the above, there are specific interviews as a result of allegations or investigative leads indicating a need for specific coverage.

2. As a result of the above discussions, it is recommended that the following polygraph policy be enunciated by you:

> Polygraph testing of all EOD's; all conversions (where possible) from covert status to staff employee; all employees returning from overseas, and all persons going out PCS, who have not been interviewed for at least five years, after appropriate screening to waive testing of those personnel returning from responsible positions overseas or leaving for overseas who have demonstrated their loyalty and complete attachment to CIA. The screening will be broken down grade-wise as follows:

Up to GS-14 by Clearance Branch and IRB; 14's and 15's by DC/PSD and C/PSD; supergrades by DD/PPS, DD/S, or D/S. In addition to the above, we shall continue to have specific polygraph cases where security questions are present in the file from investigative or other sources.

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4. It is recognized by all concerned with the polygraph program that the polygraph is only one of the many aids used by the Agency to detect possible penetration and unsuitable employees and that the polygraph must be used judicially and not as a routine matter. It is further recognized that there are many elements within the Agency and outside the Agency opposed in varying degrees to the polygraph program and that we must make use of it in such a manner that we will give its enemies no cause to clamor for its elimination from our security program.



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